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Network Effects, Congestion Externalities, and Air Traffic
Delays: Or Why Not All Delays Are Evil
By CHRISTOPHER MAYER AND TODD SINAI*
We examine two factors that explain air traffic congestion: network benefits due to
hubbing and congestion externalities. While both factors impact congestion, we find
that the hubbing effect dominates empirically. Hub carriers incur most of the
additional travel time from hubbing, primarily because they cluster their flights in
short time spans to provide passengers as many potential connections as possible
with a minimum of waiting time. Non-hub flights at the same hub airports operate
with minimal additional travel time. These results suggest that an optimal conges-
tion tax might have a relatively small impact on flight patterns at hub airports. (JEL
L2, L5, L9, D6)
Over the last few years, air traffic delays have
garnered increasing attention. The year 2000
produced record delays with more than one-
quarter of all flights arriving at least 15 minutes
behind schedule. With infrastructure improve-
ments being years away and conventional wis-
dom holding that delays are caused by
congestion externalities, proposed policy reme-
dies have focused on economic solutions such
as congestion pricing. However, selecting the
appropriate remedy depends crucially on what
is causing congestion and delays. In this paper,
we try to determine the economic underpin-
nings of air traffic congestion.
One potential cause of greater travel times is
the classic congestion externality, also known
as the “tragedy of the commons.” According to
this hypothesis, congestion occurs because most
airports allow unlimited landings and takeoffs
and airlines schedule flights without valuing the
fact that their traffic will increase travel time for
other airlines.1 Failure to internalize the true
marginal cost of adding a flight leads to con-
gestion at airports and flights being delayed.
The standard solutions are to use a Pigouvian
tax, such as pricing by time of day or the length
of a queue, or to restrict traffic and assign prop-
erty rights by selling ownership of scarce land-
ing slots at congested airports. Previous
empirical research has focused on these solu-
tions, suggesting that a congestion tax would
have substantial efficiency gains in reducing the
level of delays [Alan Carlin and R. E. Park
(1970); Steven Morrison and Clifford Winston
(1989); Joseph I. Daniel (1995); Daniel and
Munish Pahwa (2000)].
One problem with the congestion externality
explanation for delays, however, is that it is not
consistent with the delay pattern across all U.S.
airports. In the “tragedy of the commons,” it is
usually assumed that there are multiple agents
who do not take into account the externality that
they create for others. While congestion exter-
nalities might explain why airports without a
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1 See models in William S. Vickrey (1969) and Richard
Arnott (1979) as examples of transport systems with inef-
ficient congestion.
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single dominant carrier, such as LaGuardia, Los
Angeles, JFK, or Boston, should have high de-
lays, this model may not explain why airports
that are dominated by one large carrier, such as
Philadelphia, Newark, Atlanta, or Detroit, are
consistently among the airports with the largest
overall delays.2
We propose a second explanation for high air
traffic delays: the network benefits associated
with the hub and spoke system.3 Just one new
round-trip flight from a hub where an airline
already connects to N cities will create 2N
additional connecting routes. Since the number
of potential connections grows exponentially in
the number of markets served by the hub car-
rier, as long as demand for air travel in potential
new markets is not diminishing faster than the
increasing benefits of the larger network, a hub
carrier has an incentive to serve an ever greater
number of markets. These increasing returns to
scale are offset by the limited flight capacities of
airports, so a hub airline must trade off the
higher benefits of serving additional markets
against rising marginal congestion costs due to
more traffic, such as longer connecting times
and greater delays. According to this simple
model, longer delays at hub airports are the
equilibrium outcome of a hub airline equating
high marginal benefits from hubbing with the
marginal cost of delays.
At a typical airport, hub airlines want to
maximize the number of possible connecting
markets for passengers, but also want to mini-
mize passenger travel time spent on congestion
delays or waiting for flight connections. To
solve this problem, hub carriers often choose to
cluster their flights at periodically spaced “hub-
bing times” to create the greatest variety of
passenger destinations but these convenient
connections come at the cost of higher conges-
tion. Hub carriers can partially offset the in-
creased congestion by smoothing scheduled
flight arrival times, albeit by increasing the
length of connections for some passengers.
Non-hub carriers, who do not obtain network
benefits, have no incentive to cluster flights at
the same peak hubbing times and thus will incur
fewer delays than the hub carrier.4
We examine these hypotheses using U.S. De-
partment of Transportation data on flights from
1988–2000 by all major air carriers with more
than a 1-percent U.S. market share, over 66
million flights in total covering more than 250
airports. Our primary measure of congestion
delay is the increase in travel time relative to the
minimum feasible time on a route. On average,
a flight originating at a hub airport requires up
to 7.2 minutes longer to travel to its destination
than a flight originating at a non-hub airport.
Planes flying to a hub airport take up to 4.5
more minutes, on average. Delays at hub air-
ports are increasing in the size of the hub,
defined as the number of markets served by the
hub carrier. However, the hub carrier itself
bears most of the increase in travel time asso-
ciated with hubs. In all cases, hubbing-related
delays are significantly larger for flights depart-
ing from a hub than for arriving flights.
The increase in delays associated with hub-
bing is partially offset by reduced congestion
externalities at airports where the hub carrier has a
dominant market share. However, the empirical
impact of airport concentration (Herfindahl-
Hirschman Index [HHI]), which we use as a
proxy for the extent to which delay costs are
internalized by the carriers at the airport, is
much more modest than for hubbing. A 20-
percentage-point increase in airport concentra-
tion leads to a 0.3- to 1.4-minute decrease in
travel time for all flights at the airport, depend-
ing on whether or not we include airport fixed
effects. This effect is similar for both arriving
and departing flights.
After 1995, we have more detailed data on
travel times and are able to decompose the
source of delays. All of the additional travel
time due to originating at a hub is spent waiting2 Jan K. Brueckner (2002) shows that a single dominant
carrier will internalize much of the externality that would
otherwise lead to greater delays. The paper demonstrates
that with one or more large carriers at an airport the optimal
congestion tax is a decreasing function of the market share
of the dominant carrier(s).
3 See Nicholas Economides (1996) for a general expla-
nation of the economics of networks and Garth Saloner and
Andrea Shepard (1995) for an example of empirical evi-
dence in favor of internalized network benefits in the adop-
tion of ATMs.
4 Daniel (1995), David Encaoua et al. (1996), and Sev-
erin Borenstein and Janet Netz (1999) come to a different
conclusion, suggesting that demand peaks and competition
between carriers drives hub and non-hub airlines to cluster
their flights at the same departure times. None of these
papers incorporates the impact of network effects on sched-
uling decisions.
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at the gate or in line on a taxiway waiting to take
off. If the destination airport is the airline’s hub,
some of the excess travel time occurs in the air,
but the bulk of the additional delay comes from
taxiing to the gate or waiting for a gate to
become available. In addition, we can reject the
hypothesis that hub carrier delays are the result
of cascading delays due to late arriving aircraft
on the previous inbound flight.
Alternative views of hub and spoke econom-
ics typically emphasize market power or econ-
omies of scale rather than the network effects
we find. Previous empirical work has shown
that hubbing gives the dominant hub carrier
significant market power on nonstop flights to
and from the hub airport.5 Some papers attribute
the market power associated with hubs to bar-
riers to entry imposed by a dominant airline,
such as frequent flyer programs or computer
reservation systems. Others argue that airlines
benefit from economies of density, so that mar-
ginal costs decrease with number of markets
served and the scale of service on those routes
[Douglas Caves et al. (1984); Brueckner et al.
(1992); Brueckner and Pablo T. Spiller (1994)].
Hubs may also increase the economic efficiency
of an airline’s operations [Scott McShan and
Robert Windle (1989); Ken Hendricks et al.
(1995, 1997); Brueckner and Yimin Zhang
(2001)]. While market power and cost efficien-
cies are important factors in hub and spoke
networks and could explain some delays at hub
airports, neither explains why, in the absence of
increasing returns to network connections, the
hub carrier would accept high delays on its own
hub flights relative to non-hub carrier flights to
or from the same airport.6
The next section discusses the impact of net-
work benefits and congestion externalities on
the scheduling decisions of a hub and non-hub
carrier and the resulting impact on air traffic
delays. Section II describes the data and our
measure of congestion delay. Section III pre-
sents the empirical specification and results and
Section IV concludes with a policy discussion
and an agenda of future research.
I. Hubbing, Network Benefits, and Flight Delays
In this section, we describe how network
benefits and congestion externalities lead to
greater delays.7 We also present a series of
graphs of scheduled flights at the Dallas-Fort
Worth and Boston airports as an example of
scheduling practices by hub and non-hub carri-
ers. In the end, we will be left with four basic
empirical predictions. First, hub airports should
be more congested than non-hub airports since
hub airlines receive large network benefits from
additional flights and thus are willing to accept
greater marginal delay costs. Second, the bulk
of the delays at hub airports should be borne by
hub airlines’ flights. Third, hub airlines could
have greater delays for departures than arrivals.
Finally, an airline’s failure to internalize the
delays caused to other airlines’ flights will typ-
ically lead to overscheduling at the airport.
A non-hub carrier makes a straightforward
profit-maximizing calculation when considering
how to schedule flights at a given airport. The
airline obtains revenue from offering point-to-
point service between the airport and other cit-
ies, where that revenue is net of costs such as
fuel, labor, and the rental costs of aircraft. On
the cost side, congestion at an airport causes
passengers to endure longer travel times, reduc-
ing their willingness to pay for a ticket, and
increases an airline’s operating costs such as
fuel and labor. Thus a non-hub carrier trades off
the marginal benefit of adding a flight to a new
destination against the congestion cost of that
flight, plus the cost of additional congestion that
flight would impose on the non-hub carrier’s
other flights. Assuming that the non-hub carrier
chooses to serve the highest value cities first,
5 See Borenstein (1989, 1990, 1991, 1992), Alfred Kahn
(1993), E. Han Kim and Vijay Singal (1993), Borenstein
and Nancy Rose (1994), Singal (1996), Anming Zhang
(1996), and Matthew Hergott (1997) for a discussion of the
impact of hubs and having a dominant carrier at an airport
on fares.
6 While large enough declines in average cost with ad-
ditional markets would generate a positive correlation be-
tween markets served and willingness to accept delays, it is
inconsistent with hub carriers choosing to concentrate their
flights at hubbing times. A carrier that was concerned with
gaining low costs associated with serving additional cities,
but was not interested in network benefits from connections,
would evenly space its flights over the day to reduce con-
gestion costs. Monopoly power raises the benefits of serving
all cities, but the marginal benefit of serving any additional
city still declines without considering network benefits.
7 A working paper version of this article showed how
these results could be obtained in a more formal model. That
version is available from the authors upon request.
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the non-hub carrier will typically face decreas-
ing returns in adding flights to more cities.
A hub carrier obtains the same direct benefits
and costs as the non-hub airline, but it also gains
additional revenue by serving connecting pas-
sengers. If the hub airline already connects to N
cities, it serves N2 routes. Assuming uniform
demand across cities, each additional city
served increases revenue by 2N. That is, pas-
sengers in the new city will have N new desti-
nations, while passengers in each of the N
existing cities will have one more possible des-
tination. The additional revenue can either come
from higher load factors from connecting pas-
sengers or from higher fares due to offering
travelers from outlying airports a greater variety
of destinations. Even without identical cities, as
long as the demand for travel to and from the
next best city does not decline more than the
increase in network benefits from serving a
greater variety of destinations, the hub carrier
will still face increasing returns to scale in serving
additional markets. As before, the hub carrier will
trade off the benefits of additional flights against
the congestion costs faced by the additional flights
themselves plus the increase in congestion im-
posed on the hub carrier’s other flights.
It immediately follows that hub airports will
have more traffic and greater delays than non-
hub airports of equivalent size and with equal
local demand. Since a hub carrier benefits from
increasing returns associated with hubbing, in
equilibrium the hub carrier has a greater value
from adding more flights, or equivalently des-
tinations, than a non-hub carrier and thus will
accept greater congestion costs. In addition, as
demand for air travel increases in the cities
surrounding the hub, the value of point-to-point
and connecting service will rise, leading to a
greater equilibrium number of hub flights and
thus even more congestion.
In addition to selecting the total number of
flights, a hub airline must also decide how to
schedule its flights over the day. Since the hub
airline obtains increasing returns to scale only to
the extent that passengers can feasibly connect
between flights, the typical hub operates by
scheduling flights to arrive, allowing passengers
to deplane and board new aircraft, and then
having those flights depart. Since passengers
prefer shorter connections, longer connection
times reduce the fares an airline can collect.
Therefore, a hub airline would like to schedule
its arrivals and departures as close together as
possible, subject to the constraint that passen-
gers have adequate time to make their connec-
tions. However, airports can support only a
limited volume of takeoffs and landings, so
planning more flights or scheduling them closer
together increases congestion. In contrast, non-
hub airlines obtain all of their revenue from
point-to-point service so they have no benefit
from bunching flights together.
As long as the marginal benefit from reducing
connection times outweighs the additional con-
gestion cost, hub airlines will cluster their
flights close together in time, leading to a pat-
tern of peak loading at a hub airport. In between
these peaks are periods of inactivity while a hub
carrier’s planes are all in the air. As an alterna-
tive, the hub carrier could schedule some flights
outside the hubbing peak. The demand for
point-to-point service on those flights would be
unaffected, but the network benefits would be
lower than if they were scheduled during the
hubbing time. Passengers would be less willing
to connect from them to flights during the hub-
bing time or vice versa, reducing demand for all
the hub airline’s flights. Whether smoothing
peak traffic makes economic sense depends on
the reduction in the value of network benefits
that comes from passengers discounting longer
connections. If passengers place a high pre-
mium on short connections, it is profitable for
the hub carrier to cluster flights together despite
higher congestion costs.
This intuition is highlighted by considering the
extreme case where a hub airline minimizes con-
gestion costs by scheduling a uniform number of
arrivals and departures throughout the day. That
strategy produces the longest connection times,
reducing the value of every potential destination,
akin to providing fewer usable connections than
are actually scheduled. Since the value of hubbing
increases with the square of the number of poten-
tial destinations, a reduction in the effective size of
the network can be very costly. Thus, the hub
carrier may choose to cluster flights closer to-
gether even at the cost of higher congestion.
This pattern of hub airport scheduling leads to
two empirical predictions. First, congestion at a
hub should be increasing in the size of the hubbing
peaks. These peaks reflect demand for connecting
at the hub, so the size of the peaks can be mea-
sured by the number of potential destinations
served by the hub carrier at the airport. Second,
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delays should mainly accrue to the hub carrier
since non-hub carriers have no reason to cluster
flights, let alone during the congested periods.
Given this fact, most hub flights take place during
congested hubbing times while only a small por-
tion of non-hub flights do. Indeed, in our data
non-hub carriers appear to operate atomistically,
choosing a relatively constant, nonzero number of
flights during most periods. The correlation be-
tween the density of hub and non-hub flights at
hub airports is slightly negative (0.05) when the
hub is operating.8 Thus the average hub airline
flight would be more likely to face congestion
than a non-hub flight.
Of additional interest, although not immedi-
ately obvious at first, is the empirical prediction
that the hub airline will often choose to cluster
departures more than arrivals. To see this, sup-
pose that the hub carrier scheduled all its arriv-
als at one point in time and all the departures
shortly thereafter. This approach eliminates
costly long connections for passengers but also
maximizes congestion. It pays for the airline to
smooth some arrivals earlier as long as the
reduction in congestion from shifting an arrival
a bit earlier outweighs the lost revenue from the
longer connections for some passengers. The
hub airline will not typically choose to smooth
both arrivals and departures since then some
connections—from the earliest arrivals to the
latest departures—would be excessively long
and consumers would not want to book them.
Yet why smooth arrivals instead of departures?
The answer lies in the stochastic nature of flight
operations. Airlines know that some flights will
arrive late to the hub, but on a given day do not
know which ones will be late. By clustering de-
partures, airlines give themselves the option to
depart whichever aircraft arrive first. The data
below strongly support the prediction that depar-
ture delays at a hub are larger than arrival delays.
Finally, less concentrated airports will have
more delays. In our model, an airline—hub or
non-hub—with a low market share will sched-
ule more flights since less of the increase in
average delay due to an additional flight accrues
to their own aircraft. In other words, an airline
imposes a delay externality on other carriers
scheduled to fly around the same time. As the
airline’s share of flights increases, it internalizes
more of the increase in average delay from each
additional destination it schedules.
Explicitly recognizing that network benefits
lead hub carriers to schedule more flights and
bunch them together generates empirical pre-
dictions that differ from previous research. For
example, Daniel (1995) assumes that the hub
airline operates at exogenously determined peak
times. Around those peak times, the hub carrier
clusters its flights to minimize the cost of con-
nections and schedules longer time between ar-
rivals and departures to reduce the likelihood of
missed connections. However, non-hub airlines
in his model also prefer to fly during the same
peaks. Competition to operate in peak periods
limits the extent to which a hub airline can
smooth the peaks to reduce congestion costs
because any reduction of the number of its own
flights at the peak will be partly or fully offset
by entry of flights by the competitive fringe of
non-hub carriers. Daniel concludes that optimal
congestion pricing would increase social wel-
fare by encouraging all airlines to smooth their
arrival and departure traffic at peak times, re-
ducing congestion.9 In contrast, by explicitly
considering network benefits, our framework
predicts that only the hub airline gains enough
of an economic benefit from clustering its
flights to put up with the resulting congestion
delays. Thus hub carriers should face substan-
tially higher congestion than non-hub carriers
operating at the same airport. Since in our
framework there is less of a congestion exter-
nality, the social welfare cost of delays is lower
than in Daniel. Also, our framework explains
the asymmetry between hub arrival and depar-
ture congestion.
8 While one might expect that non-hub carriers might
prefer to operate more flights in less congested periods, in
reality, the non-hub carrier faces a variety of network-
related constraints that limit its flexibility in choosing flight
times. For example, most non-hub carriers are operating
flights to their own hubs, so they might face high costs of
moving a flight to a different period. Also, the non-hub
carrier’s aircraft might be forced to incur additional time on
the ground to wait for an uncongested period, which would
also be costly. This finding is consistent with Daniel (1995),
who also fails to reject atomistic behavior by non-hub
carriers at Minneapolis airport.
9 Daniel creates an extensive simulation model using
data from a week of flights at Minneapolis-St. Paul airport
(MSP), combining queuing theory with stochastic, time-
varying arrival rates, endogenous scheduling decisions, and
a bottleneck model to determine how air carriers should
schedule flights within a peak.
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In our analysis, we have assumed that airport
capacity is fixed over time. However, some
airports may have been able to make more ef-
ficient use of their runways by adding taxiways.
Hub airports, which have peakier demand,
might be less willing to invest in additional
taxiway capacity than non-hub airports with
smoother demand.10 If the hubbing-driven traf-
fic pattern makes it financially infeasible for hub
airports to increase their capacity to accommo-
date peak congestion, this is an additional
mechanism through which hub airports might
have higher delays. Nonetheless, differences in
capacity expansion between hub and non-hub
airports is unlikely to explain the findings that
hub airlines incur a disproportionate share of
congestion at hub airports, or that there are
asymmetries between arrival and departure con-
gestion at hubs.
The major predictions of the model are ap-
parent when one looks at the flight schedule
from Dallas-Fort Worth (DFW) airport. Figure
1 plots scheduled flights by hub and non-hub
carriers at 15-minute intervals from 6 A.M. to
midnight for an arbitrary date, Friday, October
20, 2000. DFW has two hub carriers, Ameri-
can and Delta, although American operates
the bulk of the flights at the airport. DFW is
among the most congested airports in the
country. Two facts are immediately apparent
from this figure: (1) flights are clustered into
peaks, and (2) most of the clustering is due to
the hub carriers who bunch their flights to-
gether. In addition, Figure 2 shows that the
hub carriers at DFW smooth their arrivals
much more than departures.
This pattern of clustering flights is not evi-
dent at non-hub airports. For comparison, Fig-
ure 3 plots total flights at Boston Logan Airport
(BOS) on the same date. While Delta and US
Airways have fairly large market shares at BOS,
neither operates a hub at the airport. Total
flights at BOS have many more small ups and
downs than at DFW, but DFW flights exhibit
much more pronounced peak to trough variabil-
ity than at BOS.
Clustering by the hub carrier leads to peak
flight loads at the airport and delays around
hubbing times since non-hub carriers do not
fully offset the hub’s spikes in flight volume.
Figure 4 plots the total density of flights for hub
and non-hub carriers at DFW. While non-hub
carriers choose relatively smooth flight levels
throughout the day, hub carriers bunch their
flights into peaks that are much more pro-
nounced and involve a much larger number of
flights. We explore these hypotheses further in
the empirical work that follows.
10 Although hub airports face different trade-offs from
spoke airports regarding investments in capacity improve-
ments, these trade-offs could go in either direction. On one
hand, additional capacity at hubs will only be utilized during
peak periods rather than throughout the day at a high-
demand airport such as LaGuardia or Boston. However, the
value of the extra capacity might be higher at hubs during
the peak periods.
FIGURE 1. HUB VERSUS AIRPORT’S TOTAL FLIGHTS AT DALLAS-FORT WORTH (DFW)
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II. Data
In 1988, the U.S. Department of Transporta-
tion began requiring all airlines with at least 1
percent of all domestic traffic to report flight-
by-flight statistics on delays for the top 27 air-
ports in the United States.11 This rule was
passed as a result of a public outcry over the
growth in air traffic delays in the 1980’s. In
addition, the major carriers covered by this rule
agreed to voluntarily report data on all of their
flights to or from the remaining domestic air-
ports. Indeed, our data cover more than 250
airports. Originally, the data included the sched-
uled arrival and departure time of the flight, the
actual arrival and departure time, whether the
flight was canceled or diverted, and the flight
number. From 1988–1994, airlines excluded in-
formation on flights that were delayed or can-
celed due to mechanical problems. Beginning in
1995, major carriers began reporting informa-11 A flight is defined as a nonstop segment.
FIGURE 2. HUB CARRIERS’ DEPARTURES AND ARRIVALS AT DALLAS-FORT WORTH (DFW)
FIGURE 3. TOTAL FLIGHTS AT BOSTON LOGAN AIRPORT (BOS)
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tion on all scheduled flights, regardless of the
reason for a delay or cancellation. In that year,
the data were expanded to include the time
spent taxiing from the gate to the runway, actual
flight time, time spent taxiing to the gate after
landing, and the tail number of the aircraft. Our
sample includes 66.4 million flights, which is
all data over this time period with the exception
of flights in five months that had substantially
missing or corrupted data files.12
The most widely reported indicator of con-
gestion is airline on-time performance: the per-
centage of flights that arrive within 15 minutes
of scheduled arrival time. Canceled and di-
verted flights are treated as late arrivals. One
problem with on-time performance as a measure
of true delay is that airlines can manipulate it by
adjusting their scheduled flight times to com-
pensate for expected delays. However, the total
cost to passengers and airlines from congestion
or hubbing is a function of how much additional
travel time these factors impose. Thus we con-
struct a measure of delay that is unaffected by
airline scheduling: actual travel time minus
minimum feasible travel time. Minimum travel
time is defined as the shortest observed travel
time on a given nonstop route in a particular
month. We consider the minimum feasible time
to be a useful benchmark for what travel time
would be if airports were sufficiently uncon-
gested and weather were equally favorable. Net-
ting out the minimum time controls for possible
changes over time in the types of routes flown
or in the performance of the air traffic control
system that could affect average flying times.
Routes are directional to allow for prevailing
winds and other physical differences in travel,
so we consider Philadelphia to Los Angeles to
be a different route than Los Angeles to Phila-
delphia. Travel time is computed as the actual
arrival time minus the scheduled departure time
and thus includes delays in the flight leaving the
gate.
Figure 5 plots average minimum travel time,
scheduled travel time, and actual travel time.
For consistency, the data used in Figure 5 in-
clude only routes where we observe flights in
each month of the entire sample period. Actual
travel time exceeds minimum travel time by
more than 32 minutes in the year 2000. This
number has increased more than 10 percent over
the sample period, although as we mentioned
earlier, changes in reporting between 1994 and
1995 could account for some of that growth. In
addition, minimum travel time increased from
89 to 94 minutes over the time period, possibly
due to greater traffic systemwide.13 Clearly
12 The missing months are July and August 1993, March
1994, May 1999, and December 2000.
13 Since the average route had over 150 flights even in
1988, our lowest-volume year, we believe we measure the
minimum time with good accuracy. In principle, however,
we are more likely to observe the true minimum travel time
on routes with more flights and could overestimate the
minimum time on sparse routes. We tried reestimating our
FIGURE 4. DEPARTURE DENSITY FOR HUB AND NON-HUB CARRIERS AT DALLAS-FORT WORTH (DFW)
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carriers do not choose their schedules to have a
mean delay of zero. The average delay from
schedule of 9.9 minutes is both positive and
large and has grown over time. In fact, airlines
increased scheduled travel time by only about
two-thirds of the growth in average travel time
between 1988 and 2000.
We decompose the excess travel time into its
component parts in Table 1. Over our sample
period, the average flight required about 30
minutes more than the minimum feasible travel
time on a route. Nearly 10 minutes of that
excess is due to a late push-back from the gate.
For flights after 1995, about one-half of the total
excess travel time on the flight is spent midair,
though much of that 16 minutes is probably due
to less-than-favorable winds and weather en
route. Overall, more than one in four flights is
canceled or arrives at least 15 minutes late.
Following Section I, the measure of the size
of the hub and thus the extent of network ben-
efits should be the number of possible connec-
tions for a traveler through the hub. We define
this variable as the number of other airports that
an airline flies to from a given airport in a
particular month. Airport concentration, which
proxies for the extent to which delays are
internalized by the carriers, is defined as the
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index on the share of
flights by the various airlines that serve that
airport over each one-month period.
The bulk of flights in the United States are
associated with hubs. Table 1 shows that nearly
two-thirds of all flights in the sample originate
at an airport that is a hub, with the hub carrier
itself originating a little more than one-half of
hub flights (39 percent of total flights). In all, 83
percent of flights either originate or land at
some carrier’s hub and almost three-quarters of
all flights occur on an airline flying to or from
its own hub. The typical airport has a HHI of
0.40, although there is substantial variation
across airports.
Table 2A identifies the hub carriers and re-
ports airport concentration for all airports with
at least 1 percent of the total flights in Novem-
ber 2000. Cincinnati, dominated by a Delta hub,
was the most concentrated large airport that
month at 0.91. Charlotte and Pittsburgh, both
US Airways hubs, were close behind at 0.81.
Not every airport with a hub carrier is highly
concentrated. Many single-hub airports are only
moderately concentrated, such as Newark (0.38
with a large Continental hub) and Salt Lake City
(0.48 with a large Delta hub). Hubs with less
connection activity, such as United in San Fran-
cisco, have much lower concentrations (0.33).
Some airports have multiple hub airlines, such
as Chicago’s O’Hare with United and American
major results with an alternative benchmark, the average
travel time for the fastest decile of flights, so as to reduce
our reliance on a single flight on a route. The coefficient
estimates are slightly smaller this way, although the pattern
of delays is the same. The small drop in magnitude of the
coefficient estimates (approximately 10 percent) is likely
due to the fact that even flights in the fastest decile of the
distribution may be impacted by congestion at hubs.
FIGURE 5. MINIMUM, SCHEDULED, AND ACTUAL TRAVEL TIMES
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and only 0.38 concentration. Also, some busy
airports do not have hubs with significant con-
necting activity: Chicago’s Midway with a con-
centration of 0.71 or New York’s LaGuardia
which has a concentration of 0.22.
Overall, there has been substantial consolida-
tion since 1988, especially in the early 1990’s,
when mergers and bankruptcies reduced the
number of major carriers in the sample from 14
to 10.14 The remaining airlines have continued
to expand their hub and spoke systems, al-
though a few carriers abandoned previous hubs.
As a result, many airports looked quite different
in 1988 than they do in the year 2000. Table
2B presents the same snapshot of all airports
with at least 1 percent of the total flights in
November 1988. For example, relative to 1988,
Denver and Atlanta each lost one of their hub
carriers. Miami, Washington National, and
Cleveland gained a single hub carrier, Las Ve-
gas and Los Angeles gained two hub carriers,
and Phoenix added a second hub carrier. JFK,
Orlando, and Raleigh Durham lost their hubs
altogether. Several cities had a change of hub
airline or a change in the size of the hub. Fi-
nally, airport concentration has varied over this
time period, with many airports exhibiting a
general increase in concentration, a few airports
exhibiting a strong rise in concentration as a
single carrier consolidated its hubbing at that
airport, and several airports showing a decline
in concentration as hub carriers pulled out. In
many regression specifications below, we will
use this variation in hub size and concentration
within an airport over time to identify their
effects on excess travel time.
III. Estimation and Results
In this section, we examine the empirical
predictions from Section I regarding the impact
of network benefits and congestion externalities
on delays. First, flights operating at hub airports
should face delays that increase with the size of
the hub. Second, most delays at hub airports
should be incurred by the hub airline itself since
the bulk of its flights are during congested
peaks, and these delays should also be increas-
ing in the size of the hub. Third, delays should
be longer for flights that originate at a hub than
flights arriving at a hub, as hub airlines cluster
their departures more than their arrivals. Fi-
nally, congestion externalities should cause
higher delays at less concentrated airports, hold-
ing the extent of hubbing constant.
To test these predictions, we estimate the
following base empirical specification:
14 See Morrison (1996) for a discussion of the policy
issues relating to the merger trend in the airline industry.
TABLE 1—SUMMARY STATISTICS
Variable Mean
Standard
deviation
Actual elapsed route time minus
minimum  departure delay
30.4 14.9
Departure delay: actual push-back
time minus scheduled departure
9.7 9.8
Taxi-out time: time from push-back to
wheels-off-the-ground minus
minimum feasible time*
9.8 5.0
Actual flight time minus minimum
feasible flight time*
16.1 9.4
Taxi-in time: time from landing to
reaching the gate minus minimum
feasible time*
4.1 2.3
Origin airport concentration 0.40 0.21
Origin airport hub size:
26–45 markets 0.19 0.39
46–70 markets 0.24 0.43
71 markets 0.22 0.41
Origin airline hub size:
26–45 markets 0.09 0.28
46–70 markets 0.15 0.35
71 markets 0.15 0.36
Flight is traveling to or from a hub
airport
0.83 0.38
Flight is traveling to or from the
airline’s own hub
0.74 0.44
Buffer: minutes between actual arrival and scheduled
departure, spline terms:
Percent of
total Mean
Standard
deviation
 120 minutes* 0.004 173 63
0 to 120 minutes* 0.061 29 27
1 to 20 minutes* 0.093 13 6
21 to 40 minutes* 0.191 31 6
41 to 120 minutes* 0.403 62 17
120 minutes* 0.249 652 343
Notes: Sample includes all flights for major carriers on Fridays
from January 1988–November 2000 (N  9,956,576), except
for rows with (*) which include Fridays from January
1995–November 2000 (N  4,592,595). Also, data is miss-
ing for July and August 1993, March 1994, and May 1999.
For rows 3–5, minimum feasible time is route and direction
specific and is computed as the shortest amount of time
required for a flight on a given route and month to taxi out,
fly the route, and taxi in, respectively.
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DELAYijkmt
   1 CONCENTRATIONorg,kt
 2 CONCENTRATIONdest,mt
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 2 (HUB AIRPORTdest)mt
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 4 AIRPORTorg,k  5 AIRPORTdest,m  ijkmt
where DELAY is the measure of excess travel
time for flight i on airline j from airport k to
airport m on date t. CONCENTRATION refers
to the airport concentration of the origin (k) or
destination (m) airport. HUB is measured both
at the airport level (whether airport k is a hub
for any airline) and the airline level (whether
airline j has a hub at airport k). An airline’s hub
is defined as a function of the number of airports
airline j flies to/from airport k. We generate
dummy variables for three different ranges of
the number of destination airports: 26 to 45, 46
to 70, and 71 or more.15 Concentration and hub
15 Our results are robust to alternative functional form
assumptions, but we find that the categories provide a better
fit than a linear function and are more easily interpretable
than a higher-order polynomial.
TABLE 2A—HUBBING AND CONCENTRATION FOR AIRPORTS WITH AT LEAST 1 PERCENT OF
FLIGHTS IN NOVEMBER 2000
Airport
Airport
concentration
Hub carriers with ...
71
connections
46–70
connections
26–45
connections
Atlanta 0.72 Delta
Baltimore-Washington 0.29 Southwest
Charlotte 0.81 US Airways
Chicago O’Hare 0.38 United American
Cincinnati 0.91 Delta
Cleveland 0.31 Continental
Dallas-Fort Worth 0.52 American Delta
Denver 0.57 United
Detroit 0.63 Northwest
Houston Intercontinental 0.61 Continental
Las Vegas 0.25 America West,
Southwest
Los Angeles 0.19 American,
United
Memphis 0.66 Northwest
Miami 0.37 American
Minneapolis-St. Paul 0.66 Northwest
Nashville 0.31 Southwest
Newark 0.38 Continental
Philadelphia 0.50 US Airways
Phoenix 0.30 America West Southwest
Pittsburgh 0.81 US Airways
Saint Louis 0.52 Trans World
Salt Lake City 0.48 Delta
San Francisco 0.33 United
Washington Dulles 0.39 United
Washington National 0.23 US Airways
Notes: Airports with at least 1 percent of flights in November 2000 but without a large hub
carrier are (concentration in parentheses): Boston (0.29), Chicago Midway (0.71), Houston
Hobby (0.84), LaGuardia (0.22), Kansas City (0.23), Oakland (0.47), Orlando (0.19), Portland
(0.19), San Diego (0.21), San Jose (0.24), Seattle (0.23), Tampa (0.18).
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are included separately for both the origin and
destination airports to allow for separate effects
for each end of the flight.
We also include DEMAND variables to con-
trol for changes in local demand for air travel
over time and across Metropolitan Statistical
Areas (MSAs) that might lead to greater flight
delays, including annual population, employ-
ment, and per capita income. For airports in a
MSA, we include their MSA values, but also
interact the economic variables with a dummy
variable that equals one if the airport is the
largest airport in the MSA, a proxy for the
likeliest airport to be a hub. For airports not in
a MSA, we interact a non-MSA dummy or
Alaska airport dummy with national values of
the economic variables.16 Most of these eco-
nomic variables are of the expected sign and are
statistically significant.
All specifications have dummies for the year
and month of travel to control for unobserved
time and seasonal factors that may affect sys-
temwide delays, and for the airline, j, to control
for airline-specific scheduling factors. Finally,
most specifications are run with a full set of
fixed effects for the airport the flight originates
from (k) and the airport it arrives at (m) to
control for unobserved airport heterogeneity
that may affect delays, such as capacity.
Given that we have data on more than 66
million flights, we take two steps to make esti-
mation more manageable. First, we narrow our
data to all flights on Fridays.17 Second, in our
16 Almost all airports in our data set that are not in an
MSA and not in Alaska are located at destination vacation
spots. Many are airports at ski resort locations.
17 We construct the independent variables in our regres-
sions using all data, not just Fridays. In addition, we have
conducted some preliminary estimation on Saturdays, the least
busy day of the week, and obtain the same basic results.
TABLE 2B—HUBBING AND CONCENTRATION FOR AIRPORTS WITH AT LEAST 1 PERCENT OF
FLIGHTS IN NOVEMBER 1988
Airport
Airport
concentration
Hub carriers with ...
71
connections
46–70
connections
26–45
connections
Atlanta 0.43 Delta Eastern
Baltimore-Washington 0.47 Piedmont
Charlotte 0.80 Piedmont
Chicago O’Hare 0.35 United American
Cincinnati 0.54 Delta
Dallas-Fort Worth 0.44 American Delta
Denver 0.38 Continental,
United
Detroit 0.45 Northwest
Houston Intercontinental 0.51 Continental
Memphis 0.63 Northwest
Minneapolis-St. Paul 0.60 Northwest
Nashville 0.40 American
Newark 0.27 Continental
New York JFK 0.18 TWA
Orlando 0.17 Delta
Philadelphia 0.23 USAir
Phoenix 0.28 America West
Pittsburgh 0.69 USAir
Raleigh-Durham 0.41 American
Saint Louis 0.61 Trans World
Salt Lake City 0.62 Delta
San Francisco 0.20 United
Washington Dulles 0.47 United
Notes: Airports with at least 1 percent of flights in November 1988 but without a large hub
carrier are (concentration in parentheses): Boston (0.12), Cleveland (0.21), Houston (0.41),
LaGuardia (0.12), Las Vegas (0.24), Los Angeles (0.13), Miami (0.19), San Diego (0.13),
Seattle (0.16), Tampa (0.14), and Washington National (0.12).
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base specification we generate cells of flights by
each airline on every route for all months in
every year, a total of 617,150 airline-route-
month-year cells. Within each cell we compute
the mean of the dependent variable and all in-
dependent variables and use these cell means in
the regressions that are reported in this paper.
These regressions are weighted by the number
of flights within the cell. These weighted least-
squares coefficient estimates are identical to
what we would find using ordinary least squares
(OLS), since none of the independent variables
in our basic specification vary within the cells.
We compute robust standard errors, allowing
the residuals to be correlated over time within a
route.
A. Airport-Level Findings
Below, we find large and significant effects
of hubbing and moderate effects of concentra-
tion on delays. Our initial evidence is presented
in Table 3A. The dependent variable is excess
travel time above the minimum feasible travel
time. Consistent with our characterization of
network benefits from hubbing, hub airports
have more delays. In column (1), flights origi-
nating and arriving at hub airports face delays of
up to 7.2 and 4.5 minutes, respectively. In ad-
dition, hub delays increase monotonically in the
size of the hub. Flights that originate from the
smallest hubs are delayed four minutes more
than flights departing from non-hub airports, 6.7
minutes at medium-size hubs, and 7.2 at the
largest ones. A similar pattern holds for flights
flying to hub airports, although the coefficients
are uniformly smaller in magnitude.
We also find evidence that airports with low
concentration have higher delays, possibly be-
cause carriers do not fully internalize the costs
their flights impose on other carriers. In column
(1), higher concentration has a small but bene-
ficial impact on delays. Controlling for the
extent of hubbing, a one-standard-deviation in-
crease in concentration (0.20) leads to a modest
1.3-minute decline in delay at origin airports.
Even an increase from the mean concentration
level of 0.40 at an origin airport to an airport
with just one airline leads to just a 3.8-minute
decrease in delays, smaller than the effect of
hubbing.
One potential problem with this regression is
the possibility that the income, employment,
and population variables might not fully control
TABLE 3A—THE EFFECT OF AIRLINE HUBBING AND AIRPORT CONCENTRATION
ON TRAVEL TIME
Dependent variable: Travel time in excess of minimum feasible
Whole sample
(1)
Ordinary
least squares
Whole sample
(2)
Instrumental
variable
Whole sample
(3)
Ordinary
least squares
Origin Destination Origin Destination Origin Destination
Airport hub size
26–45 markets 4.07 2.34 4.52 0.31 0.53 1.01
(0.26) (0.28) (0.19) (0.17) (0.23) (0.20)
46–70 markets 6.67 3.62 6.20 0.85 1.93 0.82
(0.33) (0.34) (0.22) (0.21) (0.32) (0.31)
71 markets 7.25 4.49 5.44 0.79 4.12 1.92
(0.42) (0.42) (0.15) (0.14) (0.36) (0.35)
Airport concentration 6.38 6.97 4.82 1.38 1.29 2.93
(0.57) (0.60) (0.24) (0.24) (0.55) (0.54)
Airport fixed effects No No Yes
R2 0.24 0.34
Number of
observations
617,150 617,150 617,150
Notes: Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Regressions are based on the mean of the
dependent and independent variables for each airline on every route for all months in every
year. Equations also include indicator variables for year, month, and airline, and various
economic demand variables that are described in the paper.
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for local demand. In particular, airports with
high unobserved local demand for air travel
might have a greater number of flights and also
have a hub that serves a large number of desti-
nations. Thus high levels of congestion may be
due to local demand rather than hubbing. To
address this issue, we take two approaches.
In column (2), we instrument for the proba-
bility that an airport is a hub with variables that
are based on the demand for connections by
surrounding communities, rather than by the
hub city. We compute the distance from a given
airport to all of the other airports in our sample,
counting the number of airports within 500
miles, 500–1000 miles, and 1000–1500 miles,
and also sum up the population and per capita
income for the airports within each of those
rings. This gives the total demand for connec-
tions around each airport, both in terms of num-
ber of connecting airports and economic buying
power of the potential connections. The demand
variables are also interacted with a dummy vari-
able that indicates the primary airport within
each MSA. Such an interaction is important to
differentiate the largest airport from smaller
secondary airports within an MSA. These in-
struments are significant in the first stage and
are moderately successful in isolating the hub
delay effect from local demand. For origin air-
ports, the hub variables are still individually and
jointly significant and nearly as large as the
OLS coefficients, suggesting that hubs are as-
sociated with greater congestion. However, the
destination hub variables are much smaller than
the OLS coefficients and are not statistically
significant. While the instruments can success-
fully identify hubs, separate origin and destina-
tion effects may be harder to pin down. Overall,
the estimation is consistent with greater origi-
nation delays at hub airports.
In the third column we include airport fixed
effects. By effectively looking only at changes
over time within airports in hubbing, concentra-
tion, and delays, we absorb time-invariant
airport-level factors such as capacity or local
demand. However, by including fixed effects,
we eliminate a large source of variation—
differences in hubbing and delays across air-
ports. The fixed-effects estimates present the
same pattern as the earlier estimation, except
the coefficients are considerably smaller. The
biggest hubs have the largest delays and delays
increase with the size of the hub. The coefficient
on the smallest category of origin and destina-
tion hubs is negative, suggesting that these hubs
appear to have slightly better performance than
non-hub airports. However, the negative coef-
ficients themselves are small. Concentration
also reduces delays, although the coefficients
are much smaller than in the estimates that do
not include fixed effects. To the extent that
cross-sectional variation is required to identify
airport-level hubbing and concentration effects,
the fixed-effects estimates might provide a
lower bound on the true effects.
B. Within-Airport Clustering of Flights
In Table 3B, column (1), we move on to
consider an important implication of our model
of network benefits: that the hub carrier should
have greater delays than non-hub carriers at hub
airports. In this case we include separate covari-
ates for flights by the hub carrier to or from its
own hub airport. With airport fixed effects, the
hub/non-hub carrier effect is identified based on
differences between hub and non-hub airlines
within each airport, so all carriers at the airport
are subject to identical capacity constraints and
face the same level of local demand. The results
suggest that the dominant hub carrier incurs
most delays at hub airports. Relative to non-hub
airlines at the same airport, hub airlines have
excess travel time of up to 5.6 minutes at origin
airports and 2.8 minutes at destination airports.
Estimated delays accruing to the hub airline
increase monotonically in the size of the hub
and are larger for origin airports. All of these
results are consistent with the existence of
strong network benefits that lead to more delays
for hub airlines. This result also supports the
view that the peaks of traffic occur at hubbing
times rather than merely popular times to fly. If
the latter were the case, then non-hub carriers
would have just as strong a desire to fly during
the most congested peaks and their flights
would be delayed just as much as the hub car-
riers. To the degree that delays between the two
types of airlines differ, it is evidence for hub
aircraft having greater value of flying in the
peaks due to the network benefits.18
18 While hub and non-hub flight densities are virtually
uncorrelated, the share of hub flights scheduled at congested
peaks is quite high and non-hub flights are scheduled
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In this regression, airport-level hub variables
indicate the extent of delays by non-hub airlines
at a hub airport. In column (1), the coefficients
on the airport-level variables become much
smaller in magnitude, and are sometimes even
negative. The negative coefficient indicates that
the non-hub airlines have slightly lower delays
when they operate at smaller hubs rather than at
non-hub airports, possibly benefitting from
scheduling some of their flights at times when
there are few hub airline flights. Even with these
changes, the results suggest that the perfor-
mance of non-hub carriers deteriorates mono-
tonically with hub size and that non-hub carriers
at the largest hubs face worse delays than car-
riers that operate at airports without a hub.
Airport concentration remains negative and sta-
tistically significant, but its estimated magni-
tude in the fixed-effects specifications is small
when compared to the hub variables. A large
increase in the HHI from 0.40 to 1.0 leads to a
1.1- to 1.6-minute decrease in delays, less than
one-third of the increase in travel time associ-
ated with the largest hub airlines.
While hub carriers need to cluster their de-
partures to maximize network connection ben-
efits, Section I shows that they can smooth their
arrivals somewhat as long as the cost of long
connections is not too high. If delays come from
peak loads of traffic at hubs, arrivals should
exhibit lower hub-induced delays than the more
clustered departures. Our results support this
conclusion since the effect of hubbing on orig-
inating flights is much larger than on arriving
flights in every specification. The delays due to
concentration do not depend on clustering of
flights and thus should not exhibit a systematic
pattern of being larger for origin or destination
diffusely throughout the day. Hence the result that delays
accrue mainly to hub carriers.
TABLE 3B—THE EFFECT OF AIRLINE HUBBING AND AIRPORT CONCENTRATION
ON TRAVEL TIME
Dependent variable: Travel time in excess of minimum feasible
Whole sample
(1)
Ordinary least squares
Whole sample excluding
slot-constrained airports
(2)
Ordinary least squares
Origin Destination Origin Destination
Airline hub size
26–45 markets 3.38 0.28 3.04 0.0012
(0.34) (0.35) (0.34) (0.35)
46–70 markets 5.24 1.97 4.61 1.38
(0.39) (0.41) (0.38) (0.39)
71 markets 5.62 2.82 5.62 2.52
(0.45) (0.46) (0.48) (0.45)
Airport hub size
26–45 markets 1.85 0.87 0.74 0.11
(0.27) (0.26) (0.26) (0.27)
46–70 markets 0.79 0.07 0.74 1.25
(0.39) (0.40) (0.39) (0.40)
71 markets 1.04 0.50 2.22 1.44
(0.47) (0.47) (0.49) (0.48)
Airport concentration 1.73 2.65 3.24 3.85
(0.54) (0.54) (0.55) (0.54)
Airport fixed effects Yes Yes
R2 0.34 0.34
Number of observations 617,150 516,962
Notes: Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Regressions are based on the mean of the
dependent and independent variables for each airline on every route for all months in every
year. Equations also include indicator variables for year, month, and airline, and various
economic demand variables that are described in the paper.
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airports. Indeed, the estimated concentration ef-
fects are similar for both types of airports.
Finally, we consider one other factor poten-
tially affecting our results. During the sample
period, airlines were free to choose their pre-
ferred number of flights at all but four air-
ports—Chicago O’Hare, New York JFK, New
York LaGuardia, and Washington National—
where the FAA set a cap on hourly departures.
Since these airports have low HHIs, our esti-
mated coefficients on concentration might be
biased downwards because these airports might
have been more congested were it not for the
departure caps. We examine this possibility in
column (2) of Table 3B by excluding all flights
originating or departing from one of the four
slot-constrained airports. As expected, the coef-
ficients on concentration increase appreciably
from those in column (1), but the overall con-
clusions remain the same. For example, an in-
crease in the HHI from 0.40 to 1.0 leads to a
1.9- to 2.3-minute decrease in excess travel
time, still much smaller than the difference in
excess travel time between a non-hub and a
large hub carrier.
C. Further Exploration
The results in Tables 3A and 3B suggest that
hub carriers are willing to accept substantial
delays on their own flights, even at airports
where they control a large proportion of the
total flights. We investigate the reasons behind
these delays and the robustness of these results
using more detailed data beginning in 1995 that
allow us to track the movement of individual
aircraft and to decompose overall travel time
into time spent taxiing out to the runway, in the
air, and taxiing in to the gate at the destination.
To begin, we consider the possibility that
increased hub airline delays at the origin airport
relative to the destination are due to late arriving
aircraft from previous flights, so called “cascad-
ing” delays. If an aircraft is delayed arriving at
a hub, then it may be more likely to be delayed
on departure, potentially leading us to double-
count delays. In this case, controlling for late
arrivals in our regressions would reduce the
estimated effect of hubbing on departure delays.
However, this logic assumes that scheduled
connection time is the same for hub and non-
hub airlines. Since a hub airline faces additional
costs from late arrivals due to potential missed
connections, it has incentives to schedule longer
layovers than the non-hub carrier. With a longer
scheduled layover, or buffer, at their hub, a hub
airline could still turn around a delayed aircraft
and have it depart on schedule, mitigating cas-
cading delays from late-arriving flights.
As it turns out, hub carriers do schedule
longer times on the ground for their aircraft at
their hubs. For flights after 1995, we use data on
the aircraft tail numbers to compute a variable
called “scheduled buffer,” defined as the differ-
ence between the scheduled arrival time of the
airplane from its previous flight and its next
scheduled departure time. Table 4 reports the
median number of minutes of scheduled buffer,
broken out by whether the flight was on a hub
carrier and the size of the hub.19 The median
scheduled time on the ground is 40 minutes at
airports where there is no hubbing. Non-hub
carriers at hub airports schedule somewhat
longer buffer times, ranging from 45 to 50 min-
utes. Hub carriers, however, schedule yet longer
buffers, ranging from 47 to 56 minutes. The
scheduled buffer for hub carriers, and the dif-
ference between hub and non-hub carriers for a
given airport hub size, increases with hub size.
To see how this extra padding on the ground
affects our delay results, we repeat our estima-
tion controlling for the actual buffer, which is
the scheduled departure time minus the actual
arrival time. This definition of buffer measures
the actual time the plane has to be “turned
around” once at the gate, thus taking into
19 We use median scheduled time on the ground rather
than the mean in order to reduce the skewness caused by
planes parking at the airport overnight. To this end, in Table
4 we also exclude all observations with a buffer of three
hours or more.
TABLE 4—MEDIAN NUMBER OF MINUTES OF SCHEDULED
BUFFER BETWEEN AIRCRAFT ARRIVAL AND DEPARTURE:
1995–2000
Airport hub size Non-hub carrier Hub carrier
None 40
26–45 markets 46 47
46–70 markets 50 53
71 markets 45 56
Notes: Includes all flights with a scheduled buffer of three
hours or less in order to exclude aircraft that remain at an
airport overnight. Based on a 2-in-5 sample of all flights on
Fridays.
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account both the scheduled buffer from the pre-
vious table and also the likelihood that the flight
will arrive late. Given that hub flights have
longer scheduled buffers, but are more likely to
arrive late, the expected impact of controlling
for the actual buffer on hub delays is unclear.
In Table 5 we present the same base regres-
sion with fixed effects from column (1) of Table
3B with the addition of spline terms for various
levels of buffers: greater than 120 minutes, 41
to 120 minutes, 21 to 40 minutes, 1 to 20
minutes, 0 to120 minutes, and less than120
minutes.20 The last two categories reflect air-
craft that arrive after their next scheduled de-
parture. The first column includes the base
regression with the spline terms, and the second
column is the base regression run only on the
1995 to 2000 sample period for comparison.
Since the buffer variable is flight-specific, we
use flight-level data rather than the cell aggre-
gates in Tables 3A and 3B. Due to computer
memory limitations, we use a random sample of
40 percent of the flights on Fridays.
The results in Table 5 suggest that while a
late arrival is a good predictor of whether an
aircraft departs late, it does not explain the
excess delays created by hubbing. In fact, com-
paring columns (1) and (2), when we control for
the buffer the hub airline coefficients nearly
double in size and significance. This result im-
plies that the congestion faced by hub airlines at
hub airports relative to non-hub airlines is
greater than was reported in Tables 3A and 3B.
However, only some of that congestion mani-
fests itself in passenger delays since the hub
airline partially offsets it by scheduling longer
layovers than non-hub airlines.21
The coefficients on the buffer spline terms are
all of the expected sign and significance. The
coefficient on each spline term is interpreted as
the marginal impact of an aircraft arriving a
little later within a given buffer time period on
the departure time of the aircraft on its next
flight. The results show that buffer has little
additional impact on flights already arriving
more than 40 minutes before their next depar-
ture. Airlines can make up about one-half of
additional delay (10.567) when aircraft arrive
between 21 and 40 minutes prior to the next
scheduled departure by turning the aircraft
around quickly, but travel time increases about
20 We allow the kinks in the spline function to be dis-
continuous by adding indicator variables for each interval.
To conserve space, we only report the estimated slopes on
the spline function. There is very little difference, either
qualitatively or statistically, if we force the function to be
continuous.
21 When we decompose excess travel time into its vari-
ous components, a procedure which is described below, we
find that controlling for buffer only increases the measured
hub effect on delays in pushing back from the gate. The
effect of hubbing on the other portions of the flight (taxi-out
time, flight time, and taxi-in time) is unchanged to within
one second. We take this as strong evidence that our inter-
pretation of the buffer mechanism is correct.
TABLE 5—THE EFFECT OF LATE-ARRIVING AIRCRAFT ON
EXCESS TRAVEL TIME DUE TO AIRLINE HUBBING AND
AIRPORT CONCENTRATION: 1995–2000
Dependent variable: Travel time in excess of minimum
feasible
(1) (2)
Origin Destination Origin Destination
Airline hub size
26–45 markets 3.33 0.28 2.45 0.48
(0.10) (0.10) (0.13) (0.13)
46–70 markets 8.02 3.19 5.00 1.52
(0.12) (0.12) (0.15) (0.15)
71 markets 9.38 4.93 5.08 2.21
(0.12) (0.12) (0.15) (0.15)
Airport hub size
26–45 markets 2.69 1.51 3.49 1.86
(0.13) (0.13) (0.17) (0.17)
46–70 markets 3.49 1.18 2.93 1.25
(0.22) (0.23) (0.29) (0.29)
71 markets 3.21 2.02 1.98 0.94
(0.26) (0.23) (0.34) (0.34)
Airport 1.40 2.03 2.54 1.38
concentration (0.67) (0.67) (0.85) (0.85)
Buffer size
 120 0.767
minutes (0.007)
0 to 120 1.036
minutes (0.003)
1 to 20 minutes 1.064
(0.011)
21 to 40 0.567
minutes (0.008)
41 to 120 0.012
minutes (0.002)
 120 0.030
minutes (0.0001)
R2 0.42 0.07
Notes: Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Regressions
also include indicator variables for year, month, airport, and
airline, and various economic demand variables that are de-
scribed in the paper. Based on a 2-in-5 sample of all flights on
Fridays (N  1,767,565).
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one-for-one (1.064) for flights whose inbound
aircraft had a buffer of less than 20 minutes.
The fact that delays do not increase one-for-one
for the latest arriving category, more than 120
minutes late, may be due to airlines deciding to
either cancel or substitute another aircraft for
some very late flights.
The airport concentration effects are much
lower in both specifications that use the 1995 to
2000 sample period. With fixed effects, the co-
efficient on concentration is identified only by
changes in concentration within airports over a
six-year period. While there were many signif-
icant changes in concentration and hubbing
within airports between 1988 and 2000, most of
those changes had already taken place by 1995,
leaving little variation with which to identify
the concentration coefficient.
To further examine the robustness of our
findings regarding hubs, we decompose excess
travel time into its various components, includ-
ing delay in departure from the gate, time spent
taxiing to the runway, travel time midair, and
taxi time to the gate at the destination airport.
As with total travel time, each component is
measured as the excess from the minimum ob-
served on the route during the month. (The
minimum departure delay is imposed to be
zero.) To the extent that the delays on hub
carriers are due to hubbing, we should be able to
isolate these effects at the origin and destination
airports.22
Table 6 contains regression results using
these four dependent variables in our base spec-
ification, with all data aggregated into cells.
Given that the short time period with the airport
dummies makes it difficult to identify airport-
level effects, we will focus on the within-airport
hub airline coefficients. The results are consis-
tent with the network benefits view of delays.
For hub carrier flights originating at their hub,
most delays involve a late departure from the
gate or increased time on the taxiway, with the
same increasing delays with hub size that we
saw in Tables 3A and 3B. In fact, the sum of
hub airline coefficients in column (1) for depar-
ture delay and column (2) for taxi-out time is
nearly exactly equal to our total estimated delay
for flights originating at a hub in Table 5, col-
umn (2). Originating at a large hub accounts for
30 percent of the average departure delay and
17 percent of the average excess delay waiting
to take off. Originating at a hub has virtually no
effect on excess flying time or time spent on the
taxiway at the destination.
Airline flights to their own hub require about
a minute more time midair, possibly due to air
traffic queues into the hub airport. Arriving hub
flights also have two minutes longer excess taxi
times to their gates, accounting for one-half of
the average, with the delays increasing with the
size of the hub. Once again, flying to a hub does
not affect delays at the origination airport as the
departure delays and taxi-out time effects are
almost always indistinguishable from zero.
These regressions help highlight the sources
of hub delays. Inbound hub aircraft spending
additional time on the taxiway after landing
could be due to congestion on the taxiway or
time spent waiting for a gate to become avail-
able. In addition to queuing for the runway,
excess departure delays and taxi-out time at
hubs might also reflect such congestion as the
“alleyways” between gates being blocked by
other departing aircraft. All these factors are
examples of limited airport capacity leading to
congestion that would affect hub airlines more
than non-hubs.
Our final set of specifications in Table 7 takes
an alternative approach to estimating differ-
ences in travel time for departing and arriving
flights. The results in Tables 3A and 3B suggest
that flights originating at a hub have about 3
minutes longer excess travel times than flights
arriving at hubs, no matter what the size of the
22 Several seminar participants and a referee have sug-
gested that variation in speed among aircraft types may
explain some of the differences in travel time relative to
minimum travel time on various routes. We provide two
responses. In Table 6, we show that most hubbing-related
delays occur on the ground at either the origin or destination
airport, casting doubt on the likelihood that differences in
aircraft types flown by hub and non-hub carriers can explain
these results. In addition, we have estimated the specifica-
tions in Tables 3 and 6 controlling for route distance,
aircraft type, and distance interacted with aircraft type.
These added covariates reduce the estimated magnitudes
somewhat, but the qualitative and statistical conclusions
remain the same. In particular, the estimated excess taxi-in
times, taxi-out times, and departure delays at the largest
hubs decline only about 10 percent but the excess flying
time falls from 1.3 minutes to 0.13 minutes when traveling
to the hub airline’s largest hub, and from 1.3 minutes to 0.70
minutes when traveling to a 46–70 destination hub. Since
the distances hub carriers fly and the aircraft types they use
at their hubs are choice variables, we suspect that at least
some of the differences are due to these variables capturing
some delay that is actually caused by hubbing.
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hub. To examine these findings further, we
rely on an identification approach similar to
that in Borenstein (1991) in which he com-
pares fares for flights on a given route arriv-
ing and departing from a carrier’s own hub.
We compute the difference in average travel
time for departures versus arrivals on each
route for each airline. These differences in
travel time are regressed on variables for
whether the origin airport was a hub, whether
the flight was on an airline that hubbed at the
origin airport, and the concentration at the
origin airport. The coefficients on these vari-
ables can be interpreted as differences in the
travel time for departures versus arrivals for
each of the control variables.
The results in Table 7 show that the hub
airline requires about 3 minutes longer travel
time for flights originating at their own hub
versus flights arriving at their hub, nearly ex-
actly the same estimated difference between
origin and destination travel time in Table
3B. The coefficients for the hub airline are little
changed based on whether we use differences in
total travel time or travel time above the mini-
mum, or whether or not we include controls for
route distance and direction. The latter controls
are included to account for the possibility that
the average hub is located in places where orig-
inating flights are systematically faster (or
slower) due to natural weather or wind patterns.
Differences in excess travel time for flights ar-
riving or departing at hub airports (but not on
the hub airline) and at concentrated airports are
much smaller and not nearly as stable, suggest-
ing that there are very few asymmetries in ori-
gin versus destination travel time when not
traveling on the hub carrier.
IV. Conclusion
Over the last 13 years, air traffic delays have
grown considerably. From a policy perspective,
it is important to distinguish between the two
potential causes of delays: network benefits
from hubbing, which lead hub carriers to accept
higher equilibrium levels of delays, and conges-
tion externalities, which cause higher delays for
all carriers at an airport. Although we find evi-
dence that congestion externalities lead to mod-
est levels of air traffic delays, our results
suggest that hubbing is the primary economic
TABLE 6—DECOMPOSING DELAYS TO IDENTIFY THE EFFECTS OF HUBBING ON VARIOUS MEASURES OF TRAVEL TIME:
1995–2000
Dependent variable:
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Departure delay Taxi-out time Flight time Taxi-in time
Origin Destination Origin Destination Origin Destination Origin Destination
Airline hub size
26–45 markets 1.73 0.40 1.21 0.59 0.77 0.38 0.05 0.41
(0.26) (0.27) (0.12) (0.11) (0.41) (0.41) (0.07) (0.07)
46–70 markets 3.28 0.27 1.58 0.76 0.19 1.24 0.30 1.38
(0.32) (0.32) (0.15) (0.14) (0.48) (0.47) (0.08) (0.08)
71 markets 3.26 0.10 1.66 0.78 0.13 1.21 0.03 1.94
(0.34) (0.32) (0.16) (0.16) (0.47) (0.48) (0.09) (0.10)
Airport hub size
26–45 markets 2.31 1.23 1.34 0.07 0.30 0.38 0.05 0.37
(0.25) (0.28) (0.11) (0.11) (0.26) (0.30) (0.05) (0.05)
46–70 markets 1.88 0.54 0.17 0.004 1.38 0.03 0.04 0.57
(0.38) (0.39) (0.21) (0.19) (0.41) (0.40) (0.08) (0.08)
71 markets 0.91 0.03 0.03 0.03 1.28 0.04 0.21 0.90
(0.43) (0.46) (0.23) (0.21) (0.49) (0.49) (0.10) (0.10)
Airport concentration 0.06 0.98 0.21 0.47 2.58 2.95 0.07 0.60
(0.90) (1.00) (0.34) (0.38) (0.98) (1.02) (0.17) (0.13)
R2 0.17 0.57 0.30 0.64
Notes: Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Regressions are based on the mean of the dependent and independent
variables for each airline on every route for all months in every year (N  262,242 airline-route-month/year cells). Equations
also include indicator variables for year, month, airport, and airline, and various economic demand variables that are described
in the paper.
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contributor to air traffic congestion. Flights
departing from hub airports require between 4
and 7 minutes of excess travel time, while
flights arriving at a hub require 1.5 to 4.5
minutes of additional delay. However, nearly
all of the delays associated with hubbing are
incurred by the hub airline itself. Non-hub
airlines operating at hub airports face minimal
delays at all but the largest hubs. Within hubs,
delays increase monotonically with the size
of the hub and flights originating at the hub
face greater delays than flights arriving at a
hub. All of these findings are consistent with
a model in which the hub carrier receives
large network benefits that increase with the
number of markets served from a hub. These
interconnection benefits encourage the hub
carrier to bunch its flights at hubbing times,
even at the cost of additional delays to its own
flights.
From a social perspective, our findings also
suggest that the imposition of a Pigouvian tax or
arbitrary caps on airport takeoffs and landings
that do not account for the network benefits of
hubbing might result in social losses. In the
presence of hubbing, the optimal policy should
not just minimize delays without considering
interconnection benefits. Delays are not neces-
sarily evidence of a socially inefficient out-
come, but in many cases might reflect the
optimal use of scarce runway capacity by hub
airlines trying to provide consumers with a large
variety of potential destinations and relatively
short connection times. With a very high market
share during peak hubbing times when most
delays occur, dominant hub carriers already ap-
pear to internalize an appreciable portion of the
congestion costs at their own hub airports.
While hub carriers may impose a cost on non-
hub airlines by crowding them out of certain
flight times, a social planner who recognized the
network benefits from hubbing might also
TABLE 7—DIFFERENCE BETWEEN TIME REQUIRED FOR OUTBOUND AND RETURN FLIGHTS
ON ALL AIRLINE ROUTES
Dependent variable:
Difference in
(travel time in
excess of
minimum feasible)
Difference in
(total travel time)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Airline hub size (at origination)
26–45 markets 3.17 3.11 3.84 3.49
(0.08) (0.08) (0.13) (0.08)
46–70 markets 3.04 3.08 2.52 2.72
(0.08) (0.07) (0.12) (0.07)
71 markets 3.02 3.07 3.08 3.18
(0.09) (0.08) (0.13) (0.18)
Airport hub size (at origination)
26–45 markets 0.02 0.15 0.93 0.10
(0.07) (0.07) (0.11) (0.06)
46–70 markets 0.42 0.05 0.42 0.98
(0.09) (0.08) (0.13) (0.08)
71 markets 0.23 0.28 0.40 2.26
(0.09) (0.08) (0.12) (0.08)
Airport concentration (at origination) 0.24 0.37 0.66 0.52
(0.10) (0.10) (0.14) (0.10)
Direction, time, and distance
interactions
No Yes No Yes
R2 0.05 0.11 0.02 0.61
Notes: Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Regressions are based on the difference
between the mean time for outbound and return flights for each airline on every route with
bi-directional service in a month (N  303,100 airline-route-month/year cells). Direction,
time, and distance interactions include a dummy variable for direction (north, south, east,
west) interacted with a dummy variable for each month interacted with variables equal to
distance between route airports and distance squared (4  12  2  96 additional variables).
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choose a similar outcome.23 Also, not all of the
costs of hubbing show up in delays. Hub air-
lines schedule longer layovers for their aircraft
at their hubs, at a cost of having their planes sit
idle, but reducing the extent of passenger de-
lays. These costs, too, are internalized by hub
carriers.
To some degree, our finding of a small con-
gestion externality effect reflects the fact that
the four airports most likely to suffer from it—
LaGuardia, JFK, Washington National, and
Chicago O’Hare—already face FAA limits on
the number of hourly flights at the airports.
Indeed, our measured congestion externality ef-
fect increases when we exclude these airports
from the estimation. In addition, in a well-
publicized policy shift, the FAA recently re-
moved the hourly caps on service at LaGuardia,
an airport that has a low concentration, no sin-
gle dominant hub carrier, small capacity, and
large local demand. Airlines immediately
moved in to increase service. Shortly thereafter,
LaGuardia accounted for about 25 percent of all
delays of more than 15 minutes for the entire
nation. This incident, along with our empirical
results, suggests that congestion externalities
are important at some airports, and would be
more important were the FAA to remove the
caps at any of the slot-constrained airports.
Congestion pricing may be an appropriate solu-
tion for the inefficiency at these airports.
REFERENCES
Arnott, Richard. “Unpriced Transport Conges-
tion.” Journal of Economic Theory, October
1979, 21(2), pp. 294–316.
Borenstein, Severin. “Hubs and High Fares:
Dominance and Market Power in the U.S.
Airline Industry.” RAND Journal of Econom-
ics, Autumn 1989, 20(3), pp. 344–65.
. “Airline Mergers, Airport Dominance,
and Market Power.” American Economic Re-
view, May 1990 (Papers and Proceedings),
80(2), pp. 400–04.
. “The Dominant-Firm Advantage in
Multi-Product Industries: Evidence from the
U.S. Airlines.” Quarterly Journal of Econom-
ics, November 1991, 106(4), pp. 1237–66.
. “The Evolution of U.S. Airline Com-
petition.” Journal of Economic Perspectives,
Spring 1992, 6(2), pp. 45–73.
Borenstein, Severin and Netz, Janet. “Why Do
All Flights Leave at 8 AM?: Competition and
Departure-Time Differentiation in Airline
Markets.” International Journal of Industrial
Organization, July 1999, 17(5), pp. 611–40.
Borenstein, Severin and Rose, Nancy. “Competi-
tion and Price Dispersion in the U.S. Airline
Industry.” Journal of Political Economy, Au-
gust 1994, 103(4), pp. 653–83.
Brueckner, Jan K. “Airport Congestion When
Carriers Have Market Power.” American
Economic Review, December 2002, 92(5),
pp. 1357–75.
Brueckner, Jan K.; Dyer, Nichola J. and Spiller,
Pablo T. “Fare Determination in Airline Hub-
and-Spoke Networks.” RAND Journal of
Economics, Autumn 1992, 23(3), pp. 309–
34.
Brueckner, Jan K. and Spiller, Pablo T. “Econo-
mies of Traffic Density in the Deregulated
Airline Industry.” Journal of Law and Eco-
nomics, October 1994, 37(2), pp. 379–415.
Brueckner, Jan and Zhang, Yimin. “A Model of
Scheduling in Airline Networks: How a Hub
and Spoke System Affects Flight Frequency,
Fares, and Welfare.” Journal of Transporta-
tion Economics and Policy, May 2001, 35(2),
pp. 195–222.
Carlin, Alan and Park, R. E. “Marginal Cost
Pricing of Airport Runway Capacity.” Amer-
ican Economic Review, June 1970, 60(3), pp.
310–19.
Caves, Douglas; Christensen, Lauritis and Trethe-
way, Michael. “Economies of Density versus
Economies of Scale: Why Trunk and Local
Service Airline Costs Differ.” RAND Journal
of Economics, Winter 1984, 15(4), pp. 471–
89.
Daniel, Joseph I. “Congestion Pricing and Ca-
pacity of Large Hub Airports: A Bottleneck
Model with Stochastic Queues.” Economet-
rica, March 1995, 63(2), pp. 327–70.
Daniel, Joseph I. and Pahwa, Munish. “Compar-
ison of Three Empirical Models of Airport
23 These comments only relate to hub carrier choices
relative to delays and do not measure the extent to which
hub carriers have a high market share because they have
successfully limited entry by other carriers. Debates over
access to gates at the new airports in Denver and Pittsburgh
suggest that market power over local passengers is an im-
portant consideration by airlines regarding their willingness
to invest in additional capacity.
1214 THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW SEPTEMBER 2003
Pricing.” Journal of Urban Economics, Jan-
uary 2000, 47(1), pp. 1–38.
Economides, Nicholas. “The Economics of Net-
works.” International Journal of Industrial
Organization, October 1996, 14(6), pp. 673–
99.
Encaoua, David; Moreaux, Michel and Perrot,
Anne. “Compatability and Competition in
Airlines: Demand Side Network Effects.” In-
ternational Journal of Industrial Organiza-
tion, October 1996, 14(6), pp. 701–26.
Hendricks, Ken; Piccione, Michelle and Tan,
Guofu. “The Economics of Hubs: The Case of
Monopoly.” Review of Economic Studies,
January 1995, 62(1), pp. 83–99.
“Entry and Exit in Hub-Spoke Networks.” RAND
Journal of Economics, Summer 1997, 28(2),
pp. 291–303.
Hergott, Matthew. “Airport Concentration and
Market Power: An Events Study Approach.”
Review of Industrial Organization, December
1997, 12(5–6), pp. 793–800.
Kahn, Alfred. “The Competitive Consequences
of Hub Dominance: A Case Study.” Review
of Industrial Organization, August 1993,
8(4), pp. 381–405.
Kim, E. Han and Singal, Vijay. “Mergers and
Market Power: Evidence from the Airline
Industry.” American Economic Review, June
1993, 83(3), pp. 549–69.
McShan, Scott and Windle, Robert. “The Impli-
cations of Hub-and-Spoke Routing for Air-
line Costs and Competitiveness.” Logistics
and Transportation Review, September 1989,
25(3), pp. 209–30.
Morrison, Steven. “Airline Mergers: A Longer
View.” Journal of Transport Economics
and Policy, September 1996, 30(3), pp. 237–
50.
Morrison, Steven and Winston, Clifford. “En-
hancing the Performance of the Deregulated
Air Transportation System.” Brookings Pa-
pers on Economic Activity, Microeconomics,
1989, Spec. Iss., pp. 61–123.
Saloner, Garth and Shepard, Andrea. “Adoption
of Technologies with Network Effects: An
Empirical Examination of the Adoption of
Automated Teller Machines.” RAND Journal
of Economics, Autumn 1995, 26(3), pp. 479–
501.
Singal, Vijay. “Airline Mergers and Competi-
tion: An Integration of Stock and Product
Price Effects.” Journal of Business, April
1996, 69(2), pp. 233–68.
Vickrey, William S. “Congestion Theory and
Transport Investment.” American Economic
Review, May 1969 (Papers and Proceed-
ings), 59(2), pp. 251–60.
Zhang, Anming. “An Analysis of Fortress Hubs
in Airline Networks.” Journal of Transport
Economics and Policy, September 1996,
30(3), pp. 293–307.
1215VOL. 93 NO. 4 MAYER AND SINAI: AIR TRAFFIC DELAYS
This article has been cited by:
1. Hang Xiong, Diane Payne, Stephen Kinsella. 2016. Peer effects in the diffusion of innovations: Theory
and simulation. Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics 63, 1-13. [CrossRef]
2. Jeffrey C. Brinkman. 2016. Congestion, agglomeration, and the structure of cities. Journal of Urban
Economics 94, 13-31. [CrossRef]
3. Adams B. Steven, Amirhossein Alamdar Yazdi, Martin Dresner. 2016. Mergers and service quality
in the airline industry: A silver lining for air travelers?. Transportation Research Part E: Logistics and
Transportation Review 89, 1-13. [CrossRef]
4. Myung Suk Kim. 2016. Analysis of short-term forecasting for flight arrival time. Journal of Air
Transport Management 52, 35-41. [CrossRef]
5. William E. Bendinelli, Humberto F.A.J. Bettini, Alessandro V.M. Oliveira. 2016. Airline delays,
congestion internalization and non-price spillover effects of low cost carrier entry. Transportation
Research Part A: Policy and Practice 85, 39-52. [CrossRef]
6. Paul Koster, Eric Pels, Erik Verhoef. 2016. The User Costs of Air Travel Delay Variability.
Transportation Science 50, 120-131. [CrossRef]
7. Scott E. Atkinson, Kamalini Ramdas, Jonathan W. Williams. 2016. Robust Scheduling Practices in
the U.S. Airline Industry: Costs, Returns, and Inefficiencies. Management Science . [CrossRef]
8. Xavier Fageda, Ricardo Flores-Fillol. 2016. How do airlines react to airport congestion? The role of
networks. Regional Science and Urban Economics 56, 73-81. [CrossRef]
9. Harold L. VogelWings 47-117. [CrossRef]
10. Connan Snider, Jonathan W. Williams. 2015. Barriers to Entry in the Airline Industry: A
Multidimensional Regression-Discontinuity Analysis of AIR-21. Review of Economics and Statistics
97, 1002-1022. [CrossRef]
11. Yulai Wan, Changmin Jiang, Anming Zhang. 2015. Airport congestion pricing and terminal
investment: Effects of terminal congestion, passenger types, and concessions. Transportation Research
Part B: Methodological 82, 91-113. [CrossRef]
12. Achim I. Czerny, Anming Zhang. 2015. Third-degree price discrimination in the presence
of congestion externality. Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique 48:4,
1430-1455. [CrossRef]
13. Branko Bubalo, Alberto A. Gaggero. 2015. Low-cost carrier competition and airline service quality
in Europe. Transport Policy 43, 23-31. [CrossRef]
14. Mahour Mellat-Parast, Davood Golmohammadi, Kathleen L. McFadden, Jason W. Miller. 2015.
Linking business strategy to service failures and financial performance: Empirical evidence from the
U.S. domestic airline industry. Journal of Operations Management 38, 14-24. [CrossRef]
15. Ater, Eugene Orlov. 2015. The Effect of the Internet on Performance and Quality: Evidence from the
Airline Industry. Review of Economics and Statistics 97, 180-194. [CrossRef]
16. Lorenzo Mussone, Susan Grant-Muller, James Laird. 2015. Sensitivity analysis of traffic congestion
costs in a network under a charging policy. Case Studies on Transport Policy 3, 44-54. [CrossRef]
17. James D. Reitzes, Brendan McVeigh, Nicholas Powers, Samuel Moy. 2015. Competitive Effects of
Exchanges or Sales of Airport Landing Slots. Review of Industrial Organization 46, 95-125. [CrossRef]
18. Jeffrey T. Prince, Daniel H. Simon. 2015. Do Incumbents Improve Service Quality in Response to
Entry? Evidence from Airlines' On-Time Performance. Management Science 61, 372-390. [CrossRef]
19. Naoshi Doi. 2014. Mutual influence across routes using a common airport: The case of the domestic
market in Japan. Journal of Air Transport Management 40, 132-136. [CrossRef]
20. Patrick Baumgarten, Robert Malina, Anne Lange. 2014. The impact of hubbing concentration on
flight delays within airline networks: An empirical analysis of the US domestic market. Transportation
Research Part E: Logistics and Transportation Review 66, 103-114. [CrossRef]
21. Miguel-Angel Alcobendas. 2014. Airline–airport agreements in the San Francisco Bay Area: Effects
on airline behavior and congestion at airports. Economics of Transportation 3, 58-79. [CrossRef]
22. Hideki Fukui, Koki Nagata. 2014. Flight cancellation as a reaction to the tarmac delay rule: An
unintended consequence of enhanced passenger protection. Economics of Transportation 3, 29-44.
[CrossRef]
23. Achim I. Czerny, Anming Zhang. 2014. Airport peak-load pricing revisited: The case of peak and
uniform tolls. Economics of Transportation 3, 90-101. [CrossRef]
24. Daniel Greenfield. 2014. Competition and service quality: New evidence from the airline industry.
Economics of Transportation 3, 80-89. [CrossRef]
25. Philip G. Gayle, Chi-Yin Wu. 2014. On the Extent to which the Presence of Intermediate-stop(s) Air
Travel Products Influences the Pricing of Nonstop Air Travel Products. Review of Network Economics
13. . [CrossRef]
26. Alexandre Jacquillat, Amedeo R. Odoni. 2013. Congestion Mitigation at John F. Kennedy
International Airport in New York City. Transportation Research Record: Journal of the Transportation
Research Board 2400, 28-36. [CrossRef]
27. Volodymyr Bilotkach, Xavier Fageda, Ricardo Flores-Fillol. 2013. Airline consolidation and the
distribution of traffic between primary and secondary hubs. Regional Science and Urban Economics
43, 951-963. [CrossRef]
28. Hugo E. Silva, Erik T. Verhoef. 2013. Optimal pricing of flights and passengers at congested airports
and the efficiency of atomistic charges. Journal of Public Economics 106, 1-13. [CrossRef]
29. Clifford Winston. 2013. On the Performance of the U.S. Transportation System: Caution Ahead.
Journal of Economic Literature 51:3, 773-824. [Abstract] [View PDF article] [PDF with links]
30. Tim Hazledine, Rory Bunker. 2013. Airport size and travel time. Journal of Air Transport Management
32, 17-23. [CrossRef]
31. Andreas Polk, Volodymyr Bilotkach. 2013. The assessment of market power of hub airports. Transport
Policy 29, 29-37. [CrossRef]
32. Gordon Phillips, Giorgo Sertsios. 2013. How Do Firm Financial Conditions Affect Product Quality
and Pricing?. Management Science 59, 1764-1782. [CrossRef]
33. Mark Hansen, Bo ZouAirport Operational Performance and Its Impact on Airline Cost 119-143.
[CrossRef]
34. Achim I. Czerny. 2013. Public versus private airport behavior when concession revenues exist.
Economics of Transportation 2, 38-46. [CrossRef]
35. Pablo Fleurquin, José J. Ramasco, Victor M. Eguiluz. 2013. Systemic delay propagation in the US
airport network. Scientific Reports 3. . [CrossRef]
36. Federico Ciliberto, Carola Schenone. 2012. Are the bankrupt skies the friendliest?. Journal of Corporate
Finance 18, 1217-1231. [CrossRef]
37. Anming Zhang, Achim I. Czerny. 2012. Airports and airlines economics and policy: An interpretive
review of recent research. Economics of Transportation 1, 15-34. [CrossRef]
38. Prem Swaroop, Bo Zou, Michael O. Ball, Mark Hansen. 2012. Do more US airports need slot
controls? A welfare based approach to determine slot levels. Transportation Research Part B:
Methodological 46, 1239-1259. [CrossRef]
39. Bo Zou, Mark Hansen. 2012. Impact of operational performance on air carrier cost structure: Evidence
from US airlines. Transportation Research Part E: Logistics and Transportation Review 48, 1032-1048.
[CrossRef]
40. Itai Ater. 2012. Internalization of congestion at US hub airports. Journal of Urban Economics 72,
196-209. [CrossRef]
41. Adams B. Steven, Yan Dong, Martin Dresner. 2012. Linkages between customer service, customer
satisfaction and performance in the airline industry: Investigation of non-linearities and moderating
effects. Transportation Research Part E: Logistics and Transportation Review 48, 743-754. [CrossRef]
42. Vinayak Deshpande, Mazhar Arıkan. 2012. The Impact of Airline Flight Schedules on Flight Delays.
Manufacturing & Service Operations Management 14, 423-440. [CrossRef]
43. Rodrigo Britto, Martin Dresner, Augusto Voltes. 2012. The impact of flight delays on passenger
demand and societal welfare. Transportation Research Part E: Logistics and Transportation Review 48,
460-469. [CrossRef]
44. Milind Sohoni, Yu-Ching Lee, Diego Klabjan. 2011. Robust Airline Scheduling Under Block-Time
Uncertainty. Transportation Science 45, 451-464. [CrossRef]
45. Achim I. Czerny, Anming Zhang. 2011. Airport congestion pricing and passenger types.
Transportation Research Part B: Methodological 45, 595-604. [CrossRef]
46. Joseph I. Daniel. 2011. Congestion pricing of Canadian airports. Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue
canadienne d'économique 44:10.1111/caje.2011.44.issue-1, 290-324. [CrossRef]
47. Andrew C. L. Yuen, Anming Zhang. 2011. AIRPORT CONGESTION PRICING AND ITS
WELFARE IMPLICATIONS: THE CASE OF VARIABLE PASSENGER TIME COSTS. Pacific
Economic Review 16:10.1111/paer.2011.16.issue-1, 83-102. [CrossRef]
48. John A. Bishop, Nicholas G. Rupp, Buhong Zheng. 2011. Flight Delays and Passenger Preferences:
An Axiomatic Approach. Southern Economic Journal 77, 543-556. [CrossRef]
49. Silke J. Forbes, Mara Lederman. 2010. Does vertical integration affect firm performance? Evidence
from the airline industry. The RAND Journal of Economics 41:10.1111/rand.2010.41.issue-4, 765-790.
[CrossRef]
50. Ahmed Hassan, Khaled Abdelghany, Ahmed Abdelghany. 2010. Modeling Framework for Evaluating
Sensitivity of Airline Schedules to Airport Congestion Pricing. Transportation Research Record:
Journal of the Transportation Research Board 2177, 33-40. [CrossRef]
51. Samir Elhedhli, Huyu Wu. 2010. A Lagrangean Heuristic for Hub-and-Spoke System Design with
Capacity Selection and Congestion. INFORMS Journal on Computing 22, 282-296. [CrossRef]
52. Satyam Mukherjee, Neelima Gupte, Gautam Mukherjee. 2010. Statistical characterizers of transport
in communication networks. Physical Review E 81. . [CrossRef]
53. Hideki Fukui. 2010. An empirical analysis of airport slot trading in the United States. Transportation
Research Part B: Methodological 44, 330-357. [CrossRef]
54. Georgina Santos, Maël Robin. 2010. Determinants of delays at European airports. Transportation
Research Part B: Methodological 44, 392-403. [CrossRef]
55. Ricardo Flores-Fillol. 2010. Congested hubs. Transportation Research Part B: Methodological 44,
358-370. [CrossRef]
56. Forbes Silke Januszewski, Lederman Mara. 2009. Adaptation and Vertical Integration in the Airline
Industry. American Economic Review 99:5, 1831-1849. [Abstract] [View PDF article] [PDF with links]
57. Dipasis Bhadra. 2009. You (expect to) get what you pay for: A system approach to delay, fare, and
complaints☆. Transportation Research Part A: Policy and Practice 43, 829-843. [CrossRef]
58. Juan Carlos Martín, M. Pilar Socorro. 2009. A new era for airport regulators through capacity
investments. Transportation Research Part A: Policy and Practice 43, 618-625. [CrossRef]
59. Joseph I. Daniel, Katherine Thomas Harback. 2009. Pricing the major US hub airports. Journal of
Urban Economics 66, 33-56. [CrossRef]
60. Mark D. Moore. 2009. Distributed Aviation Concepts and Technologies. SAE International Journal
of Aerospace 1, 714-731. [CrossRef]
61. J ISHII, S JUN, K VANDENDER. 2009. Air travel choices in multi-airport markets☆. Journal of
Urban Economics 65, 216-227. [CrossRef]
62. N RUPP. 2009. Do carriers internalize congestion costs? Empirical evidence on the internalization
question. Journal of Urban Economics 65, 24-37. [CrossRef]
63. Edward R. Bruning, Michael Y. Hu, Wei (Andrew) Hao. 2009. Cross-national segmentation: An
application to the NAFTA airline passenger market. European Journal of Marketing 43, 1498-1522.
[CrossRef]
64. Austan Goolsbee, Chad Syverson. 2008. How do Incumbents Respond to the Threat of
Entry? Evidence from the Major Airlines *. Quarterly Journal of Economics 123:10.1162/
qjec.2008.123.issue-4, 1611-1633. [CrossRef]
65. Jan K. Brueckner, Kurt Van Dender. 2008. Atomistic congestion tolls at concentrated airports? Seeking
a unified view in the internalization debate. Journal of Urban Economics 64, 288-295. [CrossRef]
66. Satyam Mukherjee, Neelima Gupte. 2008. Message transfer in a communication network. Pramana
70, 1109-1116. [CrossRef]
67. Satyam Mukherjee, Neelima Gupte. 2008. Gradient mechanism in a communication network. Physical
Review E 77. . [CrossRef]
68. Joseph I. Daniel, Katherine Thomas Harback. 2008. (When) Do hub airlines internalize their self-
imposed congestion delays?. Journal of Urban Economics 63, 583-612. [CrossRef]
69. Steven A. Morrison, Clifford Winston. 2008. The effect of FAA expenditures on air travel delays.
Journal of Urban Economics 63, 669-678. [CrossRef]
70. K VANDENDER. 2007. Determinants of fares and operating revenues at US airports☆. Journal of
Urban Economics 62, 317-336. [CrossRef]
71. Michael Keen, Jon Strand. 2007. Indirect Taxes on International Aviation. Fiscal Studies 28:10.1111/
fisc.2007.28.issue-1, 1-41. [CrossRef]
72. NICHOLAS G. RUPP, GEORGE M. HOLMES. 2006. An Investigation into the Determinants of
Flight Cancellations. Economica 73:10.1111/ecca.2006.73.issue-292, 749-783. [CrossRef]
73. A ZHANG, Y ZHANG. 2006. Airport capacity and congestion when carriers have market power.
Journal of Urban Economics 60, 229-247. [CrossRef]
74. Jon Strand, Michael Keen. 2006. Indirect Taxeson International Aviation. IMF Working Papers 06,
1. [CrossRef]
75. Paul L. Joskow. 2005. Regulation and Deregulation after 25 Years: Lessons Learned for Research in
Industrial Organization. Review of Industrial Organization 26, 169-193. [CrossRef]
76. Kenneth Button. 2005. A simple analysis of the rent seeking of airlines, airports and politicians.
Transport Policy 12, 47-56. [CrossRef]
